In a very recent case, Mitchell v. Gadsden State Cmty. Coll., No. 4:24-cv-1084-CLM, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26220 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 9, 2026), a supervisor's hiring of a disabled lady, who later requested an accommodation involving a service dog, led to the supervisor's termination.  Gadsden State Community College (GSCC) is part of the Alabama Community College system and operates as an arm of the State of Alabama. A recent federal court decision found that only certain claims for a termination federal lawsuit can be based on “associational” discrimination. That form of discrimination involves wrongful action taken against an employee because of their association with a protected person.

In a nutshell, Ms. Mitchell was Dean of Student Services. She hired a lady, Ms. Passmore, whom she thought was the best candidate for a position called Dual Enrollment Specialist. The position required visits to other schools. Ms. Passmore was disabled and required a service dog. Accommodating that need on visits to other schools is where the trouble started for Ms. Mitchell.

A week after Ms. Passmore's hiring, she requested accommodation with her work visits to other schools, by permitting a service dog to attend with her. The accommodation was granted by Ms. Mitchell. However, college president, Dr. Kathy Murphy was very irritated with this and berated Ms. Mitchell for hiring Ms. Passmore. Ms. Mitchell defended herself contending that Ms. Passmore was a good candidate, and she couldn't reject hiring her simply because she was disabled and requested an accommodation. Dr. Murphy, about 10 days after this hiring, fired Ms. Mitchell without explanation.

Ms. Mitchell filed an EEOC charge for retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. However, while she did note the circumstances above, she did not identify Ms. Passmore's disability nor allege a violation of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. She received a “right to sue” letter without any favorable findings. Ms. Mitchell filed suit, but she did not allege a violation of Title VII in her lawsuit. Instead, she pled 3 counts under the ADA Title I and the Rehabilitation Act. 

GSCC immediately sought to dismiss the lawsuit contending that the State entity had sovereign immunity from ADA Title I employment claims. So, Ms. Mitchell amended her complaint to allege the claim as a Title II claim. That could apply; however, Mitchell was required to allege that she was disabled in order for Title II to apply. She did not do that, which was a problem.

Title II is 42 USCS § 12132 and states in part: “Subject to the provisions of this title, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” (Emphasis added.)

The district court, in dismissing the lawsuit, noted that Title I and Title III prohibit associational discrimination. However, it noted a gap in the law for Title II claims. As noted in Kinsey v. Aledda, No. 16-23330-CIV, 2018 WL 11352486, at *23 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2018) “the Eleventh Circuit has not determined whether an associational discrimination claim exists under Title II of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act in a Title II claim.”

Based on this, the court held that Title II claims under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act do not currently extend to “associational disability”. The court also held that the Title I claim was expressly barred from being asserted against a state entity. Those rulings led to a finding of no federal jurisdiction, so Ms. Mitchell's case was dismissed without prejudice given the lack of jurisdiction.

For now, supervisors need to beware.  You could create liability for the employer for refusing to hire a disabled employee, but if you do hire a disabled employee, you could be fired as a result. Supervisors like Ms. Mitchell can be stuck in the gap with no federal case.